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JURISTOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN STATES?
ROBERT

F.

WILLIAMS*

This Symposium is aimed at discussing Ran Hirschl's book on
'juristocracy."' Hirschl performed a very important study of the highest courts in four countries, not including the United States, and concluded that their records of progressive, distributive, social-change
decisionmaking has not been very good.2 As several conference participants observed, Hirschl avoided the usual "America-centrism"
dominating studies of judicial review. But studies of judicial review
also tend to be "national-centric" in the sense that they focus exclusively on federal high courts and do not examine state or subnational
courts in those few countries where they exist. What might be said
about the highest courts in states within federal systems? Here are
some preliminary (albeit America-centric) observations.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, American state courts
emerged as major policymakers, taking their place alongside federal
courts as important judicial actors in governmental lawmaking. This
statement is not intended to raise the "parity" debate as to whether
state courts are equal to federal courts in protecting constitutional
rights.' Rather, it is intended to point out the transformation that
many state courts have gone through in the fairly recent past and continue to go through today. After all, it has not been long that a conservative American president attacking "activist judges" could have
been referring to state judges!
The decision on same-sex marriage by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts4 may be the most broadly influential state
court decision, in a wide variety of ways, in recent memory.5 It, to* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; Associate Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, http://www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/
statecon. This is an expanded version of a presentation made on March 4, 2005, at the
Maryland/Georgetown ConstitutionalLaw Schmooze.
1. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDs JURiSTOCRACy- THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
Naw CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
2. Id. at 150-51.
3. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977);
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457 (2005).
4. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
5. See generally Lawrence Friedman, The (Relative) Passivity ofGoodridge v. Department
of Public Health, 14 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 1 (2004). The Goodridgemajority opinion by Chief
Justice Margaret Marshall (originally from South Africa) made use of constitutional rulings
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gether with an earlier Vermont decision, 6 can certainly be viewed as a
progressive, and even redistributive, constitutional, albeit state constitutional, ruling. Both cases involved a major focus on both economic
and social discrimination against same-sex couples. 7 These decisions
are, however, simply illustrative of how state courts in many jurisdictions have developed into major policymaking branches of state
government.
American state courts, not long ago, were seen as institutions primarily concerned with private and criminal law adjudication, operating in a rather narrow, precedent-bound manner.8 This began to
change a bit with the plaintiff-oriented, nonconstitutional innovations
in substantive tort law that were developed by state courts beginning
in the 1960s.9
Studies have now shown a major transition in the work of state
supreme courts.' One of these studies concluded that even by the
late 1970s, state supreme court justices "have come to view their role
less conservatively. They seem to be less concerned with the stabilization and protection of property rights, more concerned with the individual and the downtrodden, and more willing to consider rulings
that promote social change.""
from Canada. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. ChiefJustice Marshall explained her reliance
on constitutional materials from other countries in Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise ParentsDo
Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children". Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global
Jurisprudence,79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1633 (2004). See also Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131
n.21 (Or. 1981) (relying in part on international human rights norms to prohibit the mistreatment of prisoners); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863 n.5 (W. Va. 1979) (citing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in recognizing education as a fundamental right);
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513-15 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the Ster-

ling and Pauley courts' reliance on international human rights norms).
6. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); see also Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions
and New Issues: NationalLessons from Vermont's State ConstitutionalCase on Marriageof Same-Sex
Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001) [hereinafter Old Constitutions and New Issues].
7. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963-68; Baker, 744 A.2d at 883-86.
8. Of course, state courts did strike down, in Lochner-like fashion, many Progressive
Era statutes around the turn of the last century. Many progressives who distrust the potential of judicial review base that distrust on fear of a return to those days.
9. G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE

(1988).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 817-18 (1981) (documenting a trend of increasingly elaborate state court opinions); Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 18701970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121, 152-55 (1977) [hereinafter Kagan et al., The Business of State
Supreme Courts] (describing a shift in the focus of state supreme courts from commercial to
noncommercial cases); Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76
MICH. L. REv. 961, 998-1001 (1978) (suggesting that changes in the structure of state courts
have allowed them to focus more on social and economic cases).
11. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, supra note 10, at 155.
AND NATION 34-40
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Probably the most important development reflecting the emergence of state courts as policymakers has been the "newjudicial federalism. '1 2 The new judicial federalism dates from the early 1970s and,
of course, cannot be described as "new" anymore.' 3 Over the years,
state judges in numerous cases have interpreted their state constitutional rights provisions to provide more protection than the national
minimum standard guaranteed by the federal constitution. In addition, scholarly publications by state judges have helped develop the
doctrines included within the new judicial federalism.1 4
These developments have made it very clear that, with respect to
federal constitutional rights, decisions of the United States Supreme
Court may be divided into two categories: (1) those that find in favor
of rights claimants and therefore must be enforced throughout the
country under the Supremacy Clause; and (2) those that find against
rights claimants, determining that there are no enforceable federal
constitutional rights and effectively leaving the matter to the states. 5
This latter category of decisions leads to the argument that the United
States Supreme Court has not been very progressive or distributive.
The recognition that when the United States Supreme Court declines
to recognize federal constitutional rights it is, quite literally, leaving
the matter to the states has encouraged a generation of state judges to
enter the realm of constitutional discourse about rights. The United
States Supreme Court, as well as individual Justices, have reminded
state courts of this opportunity many times.' 6
Not surprisingly, it appears that the model of constitutional
policymaking in the realm of civil liberties established by the United
States Supreme Court beginning in the 1950s (albeit not overly progressive, positive, or distributive) may have actually stimulated the
later, similar involvement of state courts. In the words of G. Alan
Tarr:

12. See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New JudicialFederalism's
First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. vii (1996). This portion of the Essay draws from Robert
F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New JudicialFederalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
Am. L. 211, 211-12 (2003) [hereinafter The Third Stage of the NewJudicialFederalism].
13. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond the "NewFederalism," 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi, vi (1984).
14. The Third Stage of the New JudicialFederalism, supra note 12, at 211.
15. Id at 212; Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional
Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 143, 165-71 (1987).
16. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940, 942-43 (1997) (Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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[W]hen the Burger Court's anticipated-and to some extent
actual-retreat from Warren Court activism encouraged civil
liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of the proceeding decades had laid the foundation for
the development of state civil liberties law.
This, in turn, suggests that, paradoxically, the activism of
the Warren Court, which was often portrayed as detrimental
to federalism, was a necessary condition for the emergence
of vigorous state involvement in protecting civil liberties.' 7
This still-relatively-new participation of state courts in civil liberties dialogue has spawned an extremely wide literature,' 8 as well as a
very interesting array of methodological approaches to the question of
when and how state courts should interpret their state constitutions to
provide more rights than the federal constitution.1 9 The many approaches to methodology respond to the central jurisprudential question of the new judicial federalism. Tarr has noted that, in contrast to
the great question in federal constitutional law about the legitimacy of
judicial review itself, the central question in state constitutional law
concerns the legitimacy of state constitutional rulings that diverge
from, or go beyond, federal constitutional standards.2" Is this form of
state court 'jurisdictional redundancy," to use Robert Cover's term, a
good thing?2 Is it legitimate? One of the key features of this methodology/legitimacy debate is the attempt by state judges to develop
seemingly objective criteria to govern them in deciding whether to
diverge from federal constitutional minimum standards.2 2
The emergence of state constitutional law as an important element of state courts' dockets began with criminal procedure decisions, 2 3 reacting to the United States Supreme Court's more grudging

views of these guarantees at the federal level, but moved quickly into
17. G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New JudicialFederalism, 24 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1994, at 63, 73.

18. E.g., Susan King, State Constitutional Law Bibliography: 1989-1999, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
1623 (2000).
19. Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: ContinuingMethodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1015, 1018-26 (1997).
20. G. ALAN TAM,

UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 174-75 (1998).

21. Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictionalRedundancy: Interests, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 639 (1981).
22. The Third Stage of the New JudicialFederalism, supra note 12, at 218-19.
23. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. Rav. 1141, 1144-55 (1985) (documenting the rise of
state constitutional criminal law).
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other important areas such as school finance litigation,24 free speech
claims under circumstances where there was not enough state action
to invoke the First Amendment,2 5 abortion,2 6 and-most recently-to
gay rights and same-sex marriage.2 7 State court involvement in these
areas of law has, in some cases, resulted in a backlash that manifests
itself in proposed amendments to state constitutions to overrule specific decisions or to link judicial interpretation of state constitutional
rights to United States Supreme Court interpretation of the analogous
federal constitutional provision.2" Further, there have been attempts
to defeat state judges at the polls and attacks on state courts
themselves. 2 9
A number of areas of state constitutional litigation can be seen as
progressive and distributive. Major, although not-yet-completely-successful changes, as well as billions of dollars, have been redirected to
poor school districts as a result of school finance litigation that is impossible under federal constitutional law." ° A number of state supreme courts have ordered the funding of abortion under Medicaid3 1
despite a United States Supreme Court decision rejecting this claim
24. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance, ConstitutionalStructure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, XXXIII LAND & WATER L.
REv. 281, 289-91 (1998) (observing that state courts recognized education as a fundamental right under state constitutions while the Supreme Court refused to do so under the U.S.
Constitution); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights
Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 829-31 (1998) (noting how
states have taken the lead role in public education litigation since the Supreme Court
refused to characterize education as a fundamental right).
25. See Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts' and the New Jersey Supreme
Court's Treatments of Free Speech on PrivateProperty: Where Won't We Have the Freedom to Speak
Next?, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 589, 589-90 (2002) (commenting on the states' role in deciding free
speech on private property disputes under state constitutions since the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to recognize federally protected rights).
26. E.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); In re T.W., 551
So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 677
N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1997); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J.
2000); see also Rachel Weissmann, What "Choice" Do They Have?: ProtectingPregnant Minors'
Reproductive Rights Using State Constitutions, 1999 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 129, 143-46 (arguing that state constitutions may provide an alternative means of protecting abortion
rights).
27. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
28. The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism,supra note 12, at 215-19.
29. Id at 217.
30. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (ordering expenditures "to
assure funding of education in poorer urban school districts"); Campbell County Sch. Dist.
v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1243-44 (Wyo. 1995) (finding Wyoming's public school finance
system unconstitutional).
31. E.g., Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Women of State
of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925
(N.J. 1982); Women's Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va.
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under the federal constitution.3 2 Several state constitutions affirmatively recognize, and state courts enforce, the right to collective bargaining." 3 Finally, there have been numerous examples of state
constitutional litigation in which state courts order remedies against
private sector defendants where the federal courts would find no state
action. 4
Burt Neubome has argued that state courts are better equipped
than federal courts to enforce state constitutional affirmative rights.3 5
Noting the distinctions between federal and state constitutions and
judicial review, he relied on the presence of more positive rights texts,
the broader lawmaking function of state courts ("generative ethos"),
local flexibility, and the "democratic imprimatur" of state judges chosen by the electorate to argue that state courts were more suited to
enforcing positive rights.3 6 Lawrence Sager made a similar point. 7
Helen Hershkoff has urged an approach to judicial interpretation and
enforcement of state constitutional positive rights that differs from
federal constitutional interpretation." Hershkoff has also set forth a
compelling case for the adoption of new positive rights by state constitutional reformers-a recommendation clearly not aimed at courts.3 9

1993). ContraDoe v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992); Fischer v. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
32. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
33. E.g., Comite Organizador de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Molinelli, 552 A.2d 1003,
1003 (N.J. 1989); Richard A. Goldberg & Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers' Organizational
and Collective BargainingRights in New Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State Constitutional
Rights, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 729, 731-32 & nn.10-15 (1987).
34. E.g., Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641-44 (Cal. 1994); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 598-600 (Cal. 1979); N.J. Coalition Against the War in the
Middle E. v.J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760-62 (NJ. 1994); Sharrock v. Dell BuickCadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1172-74 (N.Y. 1978); John Devlin, Constructingan Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State ConstitutionalRights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and
Proposal, 21 RUTGERs L.J. 819, 822-23 (1990).
35. Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 891 (1989).
36. Id.
37. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms
and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 973-76 (1985).
38. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1136-38 (1999); see also Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712
P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986) (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications restricting
welfare benefits because of the positive rights found in the Montana Constitution); Tucker
v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451-53 (N.Y. 1977) (relying on the positive rights found in the
New York Constitution to strike down a limitation on public assistance even though the
legislature had a rational reason to enact the limitation).
39. Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 799, 805-09 (2002).
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There is evidence, at the state level, of a form of "popular constitutionalism" or legal mobilization that takes place outside the
courts.4 ° In other words, as noted earlier, state constitutional rulings
can be overturned by the electorate amending the state constitution.
Douglas Reed has noted this element of state constitutional law
(which he distinguishes from federal constitutional law), concluding
that "[t]he interpreter of state constitutions, under popular constitutionalism, is less likely to be ajudge and more likely to be a mobilized
and politically active citizenry."4 1 In fact, the events in Vermont seem
to bear out his description of effective "legal mobilization":
A key test of popular constitutionalism's capacity to resolve
the claims of gays and lesbians lies in the political majority's
ability to reconstruct the language of a constitutional right to
equal marriage as a negotiable interest that can be traded
within a framework of majoritarian policy-making. The political trajectory of the struggle indicates that this has already
happened.42
The compromise Civil Union Act passed by the Vermont Legislature
represents the translation of judicially determined rights into an "interest" subject to negotiation and compromise.4 3 The court's decision
clearly facilitated this outcome. 4 Of course, the opposite result took
place in Hawaii and during the 2004 election in a number of other
states.45
As John Kincaid has observed, federal constitutional arrangements, such as America's, which permit state constitutional rights (including positive rights) beyond the national minimum standards,
result in a "rights terrain" that may be characterized by "peaks and
valleys of rights protection" among the different component units.4 6
Such an approach is a central feature of a federal system, with a variety
of different legal rules in the component units. Kincaid explained:

40. See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTrGERS L.J. 871, 901-31 (1999) (documenting popular movements in Oregon and Hawaii advancing gay rights and same-sex marriage). This portion of the Essay
draws from Old Constitutions and New Issues, supra note 6, at 102-03.
41. Reed, supra note 40, at 875.
42. Id. at 919.
43. Old Constitutions and New Issues, supra note 6, at 103.
44. Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Foreword: State ConstitutionalLaw Lecture: Pragmatic Constitutionalism-Refiections on State ConstitutionalTheory and Same-Sex MarriageClaims, 35 RUTGERS L.J.
1249, 1257-58, 1264-66 (2004).
45. See Reed, supra note 40, at 924-31 (documenting popular attempts to amend Hawaii's constitution in an effort to prevent same-sex marriage).
46. John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism,26
RUTGERS L.J. 913, 946 (1995).
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Given that it is increasingly necessary to think globally
while acting locally, it is pertinent to suggest that this American experience with the newjudicial federalism... may have
useful implications for an emerging federalist revolution
worldwide ....

The new judicial federalism, moreover, is sit-

uated at a critical intersection between individual rights and
local autonomy, a matter of increasing importance and conflict in the post-Cold War era.
The new judicial federalism, however, suggests a model
that would enable rights advocates to continue pressing for
vigorous national and even international rights protections,
while also embedding in regional constitutions and local
charters rights that cannot be embedded in the national constitution, effectively enforced by the national government, or
enforced only at minimal levels. Such an arrangement
would produce peaks and valleys of rights protection within a
nation, but this rugged rights terrain is surely preferable to a
flat land of minimal or ineffectual national rights protection.
The peak jurisdictions can function, under democratic conditions, as rights leaders for a leveling-up process. In an
emerging democracy culturally hostile to women's rights, for
example, such an arrangement could embolden at least one
subnational jurisdiction to institutionalize women's rights,
thus establishing a rights peak visible to the entire society
without plunging the nation into civil war or back into reactionary authoritarianism.4"
Courts in a number of countries built on constitutional federalism, such as Germany,4" Switzerland, South Africa, 49 Australia,5" Canada, Mexico, and Argentina are beginning to take note of their
47. Id. at 944, 946-47. See also FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds.,
1996) and Michael E. Solimine &James L. Walker, Federalism, Liberty and State Constitutional
Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1457 (1997), for an in depth discussion of the relationship
between federalism and the protection of individual rights.
48. See PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 73-99 (1997); Arthur B. Gunlicks, State (Land) Constitutionsin Germany, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 971, 993-96 (2000) (discussing social rights emanating from state constitutions in Germany); Peter E. Quint, The ConstitutionalGuarantees of Social Welfare in the Process
of German Unification, 47 Am. J. COMP. L. 303, 310-13 (1999) (commenting on the social
welfare provisions of state constitutions in Germany).
49. See Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Provincial Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 962-63
(2000) (tracing the recent development of subnational constitutions in South Africa); Robert F. Williams, Comparative SubnationalConstitutionalLaw: South Africa's ProvincialConstitutional Experiments, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 625, 641-59 (1999).
50. See Cheryl Saunders, Australian State Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 999, 1001-09

(2000).
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subnational constitutions and the potential contained in them. 5 1 It is

possible that constitutional developments outside the courts will
follow.
In a different area of state constitutional policymaking, state
courts have served as the first line of defense (as opposed to their
more familiar fall-back, second line of defense) against a whole range
of state "tort reform" legislation.5 2 In the area of tort reform, because
there are no associated federal constitutional claims realistically available for constitutional attacks on state tort reform statutes, state constitutions generally provide the only available set of arguments. State
constitutional arguments to invalidate tort reform measures range
from general separation of powers (judicial); specific judicial powers,
such as rulemaking for practice and procedure; jury trial rights (Seventh Amendment not applicable to the states); open court and right
to remedy; legislative procedure, such as single-subject rules; and state
due process and equal protection." Several state constitutions contain specific provisions such as the following from Kentucky: "The
General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or
property.

54

The Kentucky Constitution provides further: "Whenever the
death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or
wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for
such death, from the corporations and persons so causing the
same."5 5 Such provisions may obviously prove extremely useful in
blocking tort reform measures such as damage caps as they call on
state courts to simply enforce, rather than create, constitutional policy. State constitutional decisions striking down tort reform measures
51. Ronald L. Watts, Foreword:States, Provinces, Ldnder, and Cantons: InternationalVariety
Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941, 953-58 (2000); see also Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational ConstitutionalSpace: A View from the States, Provinces, Regions, Ldnder, and Cantons, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY
RIGHTS 3, 15-16 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams, & Joseph Marko eds., 2004).
52. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Tort Reform and State ConstitutionalLaw, 32 RUTGERS
L.J. 897, 897-99 (2001).
53. Id. at 897-98.
54. Ky. CONST. § 54; accord ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 31; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19a; UTAH CONST. art. XVI, § 5; Wvo. CONST. art.
X, § 4.
55. Ky. CONST. § 241; see, e.g., Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) (invalidating
statutes limiting tort actions against home contractors because of the Kentucky Constitution). The Arizona Constitution contains a similar provision. See Asjz. CONST. art. XVIII,
§ 6 ("The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the
amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.").
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seem to at least preserve the distributive justice features of the modern American tort system.
In addition to the direct conflict over tort reform measures, the
litigation "war" over the state constitutional validity of state tort reform statutes has apparently had an important collateral effect on
campaign financing of judicial elections at the state level. 6 Judicial
elections have become much higher-visibility affairs in some states.
A number of the tort reform cases turn on perceived intrusions
by the legislature into judicial power. In analyzing judicial power
under modern state constitutions, Adrian Vermeule has made a very
important distinction between "freestanding judicial power" and "specific constitutional provisions that protect or regulate the judiciary's
authority and jurisdiction." 7 The former category is the general concept ofjudicial power arising from a state constitution's assignment of
this power to the courts in the judicial article.58 The latter category
covers the more specific state constitutional grants of authority to the
judiciary, such as the judicial rulemaking power, the power to regulate
the practice of law, and the prohibition on legislative reductions of
judicial compensation, as well as the individual's right to a jury trial
and a remedy for injuries. 9
Vermeule surveyed a number of state cases purporting to exercise
freestanding judicial power (he did not analyze specific judicial power
cases) and concluded that the cases he examined reflected the courts'

"paranoid style," including a "tendency to rhetorical excess, in particular a certain belligerence and defensiveness."6 0 He further concluded
that they "sweep beyond any defensible conception of judicial
power."6 1 This led him to propose that freestanding judicial power
claims be considered nonjusticiable.6 2
Recently, John Fabian Witt has reminded us that there was an
earlier, more plaintiff-oriented wave of tort reform statutes toward the
56. See Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in TexasJudicialElections: The Sickness and Its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and JudicialDecisions: A
Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 655 (1999) (noting that trial
lawyers compete against business interests in an effort to influence judicial elections); Sean
Reilly, Doin' the Bench Shuffle: Tort Reform Republicans Now Sit on Ala. High Court, A.BA. J.,
Nov. 1999, at 26, 26 (describing the recruitment of pro-business judges in Alabama beginning in 1994).
57. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 Sup. CT.
REv. 357, 357 n.1 (2001).
58. Id. at 359.
59. Id. at 357 n.1.
60. Id. at 360, 387.
61. Id. at 360.
62. Id. at 361.
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end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century. 6' These statutes directed reform from what would now be
considered the plaintiffs' side, rather than from the defendants' side
as is the case currently. These were liability laws imposed on employers and the railroads (including liability for damage caused by engine
sparks and destruction of cattle) and workers' compensation statutes. 64 The courts' actions in striking down or limiting a number of
these laws brought a strong negative reaction from both the public
and the legislatures and a number of political attacks on the state judiciary, particularly when they stood in the way of workers' compensation. 65 Witt issued a cautionary note about the possibility of a new
backlash against the state courts currently involved with tort reform
litigation.6 6 In fact, as noted above, such a backlash has already begun
in some states, where major political efforts to unseat judges have
67
been undertaken, causing judicial election costs to skyrocket.
Political scientists have begun studies attempting to challenge the
accepted wisdom that it is judicial independence that supports innovation and activism in the judiciary.68 One such study concluded that
"systemic factors that isolate state courts of last resort from political
pressures decrease the propensity of these institutions to act in a
countermajoritarian fashion. '69 This tentative finding, contrary to
what we have thought before, has obvious implications for analyzing
the involvement of elected state judges in judicial review. State courts
are not simply "little" versions of the federal courts. For example, a
large majority of state judges face the electorate in either partisan,
nonpartisan, or merit-retention elections. 7' The range of powers allocated to the judicial branch under state constitutions differs both
quantitatively and qualitatively from the 'judicial power" enumerated
in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. One of the most important
innovations in state court structure in the twentieth century is the advent of intermediate appeals courts, which are often the courts of last
63. John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36
RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68. James P. Wenzel et al., Legislatingfrom the State Bench: A ComparativeAnalysis ofJudicial Activism, AM. POL. Q., July 1997, at 363, 363; see alsoJames N.G. Cauthen, JudicialInnovation Under State Constitutions: An Internal Determinants Investigation, 21 AM. REv. POL. 19,
35-36 (2000); James M. Lutz, Regional Leaders in the Diffusion of Tort Innovations Among the
American States, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1996, at 39, 42-43.
69. Wenzel et al., supra note 68, at 376.
70. Id. at 377 n.3.
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resort for many matters, thereby freeing state supreme courts from
some of the pressure of caseloads and to focus more on broad policy
rulings.7 1 This structural change is a major contributing factor to
state supreme courts' emergence as policymakers. For example, when
the 1947 NewJersey Constitutional Convention revised the judicial article, it designed the state supreme court on the model of the United
States Supreme Court.7' This would have been unheard of fifty years
earlier. The New Jersey Supreme Court, based partly on its structure
and partly on gubernatorial appointment practices, has become one
of the leading policymaking state supreme courts in the country. It
exercises its powers to make policy, like many other state courts, not
only through constitutional adjudication but also through statutory interpretation, common-law cases, and rulemaking.7 In fact, rights decisions in state high courts that are more protective than federal
constitutional law are not only based on state constitutions but may
also be based on common law or statute. 4
State courts' institutional position in state government is different
from the Supreme Court's position in the federal system. 75 The relationship between state supreme courts and state legislatures, therefore, is different from the Supreme Court's relationship to Congress.
Beginning soon after independence, the balance of power between
state legislatures and judiciaries has been gradually shifting, increasing judicial authority at the expense of legislative authority.7 6
Further, the typical state court's judicial function is different
from the Supreme Court's. For example, state courts have traditionally performed much nonconstitutional lawmaking. As Justice Hans
Linde of Oregon observed:
When a state court alters the law of products liability, abolishes sovereign or charitable tort immunity, redefines the insanity defense, or restricts the range of self-exculpation in
71. See generally Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87
YALE L.J. 1191, 1200-02 (1978) (discussing the role of intermediate appellate courts on
state supreme court decisionmaking); Project, The Effect of Court Structure on State Supreme
Court Opinions: A Re-Examination, 33 STAN. L. REv. 951, 961 (1981) (concluding that structural changes to state appellate courts influence the style of opinions).
72. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 9, at 186-196 (tracing the development of the New
Jersey Supreme Court).
73. Id. at 233-36.
74. Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 750-52 (1992).
75. This portion of the Essay draws from Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's
Shadow: Legitimacy of the State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv.
353, 397-99 (1984) [hereinafter In the Supreme Court's Shadow].
76. Id. at 397.
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contracts of adhesion, its action is rarely attacked as "undemocratic." Nor is this judicial role peculiar to matters of
common law subject to legislative reversal. The accepted
dominance of courts in state law extends to their "antimajoritarian" role in review of their coordinate
political
77
branches in state and local governments.
Linde has further pointed out that state courts are much more often
involved in intra-governmental power and policy disputes to a degree
never seen at the federal level. 78
Many state supreme courts create law through rulemaking powers. 79 They also exercise various "inherent powers," usually at the expense of the legislative branch.8" Once thought to be legislative in
nature, these powers have devolved upon state judiciaries during the
past century. 81 State courts are arguably closer to state affairs and
more accountable than federal courts.8 2 Standing and other justiciability barriers are usually lower at the state level.8 "
The texts of state constitutions may provide for state judicial review of legislative and executive action. For example, the Illinois Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting "special" laws where
general laws can be made applicable and states that "[w] hether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial
determination. '"84 This is certainly true with respect to state supreme
courts' advisory opinions.8 " Interestingly, when state supreme courts
issue advisory opinions they act more like European constitutional
courts than the United States Supreme Court. In fact, judicial review
77. Hans A. Linde,Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972).
78. Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Difflrence!, 46
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1273, 1274-75 (2005).
79. Jeffrey A. Parness, Correspondence, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88
YALE L.J. 1319, 1319-20 (1979).
80. Michael L. Buenger, Of Money andJudicialIndependence: Can Inherent Powers Protect
State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 Ky. L.J. 979, 1000-02 (2004).
81. In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 75, at 399.
82. Developments in the Law: The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1324, 1351 (1982).
83. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking theJudicial Function, 114 HARV.L. REv. 1834, 1852-68 (2001); Hans A. Linde, Structures and Terms of Consent:
Delegation, Discretion, Separation of Powers, Representation, Participation, Accountability?, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 823, 834-35 (1999).
84. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (emphasis added); see also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (stating that property may not be taken for public or private use withoutjust compensation and
that "the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public").

85. See Hershkoff, supra note 83, at 1844-52 (noting the ability of state courts to issue
advisory opinions).
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itself was a phenomenon of state law well before Marbury v. Madison.8 6
Also, contrary to the federal experience, most judiciary provisions of
state constitutions have been revised and ratified in the past century
without a serious struggle over the exercise of judicial review.87

These observations are provided not to support a claim that
American state courts are somehow better than the American federal
courts, to defend state courts, or to contend that state courts are better at governing than state legislatures. Rather, the point is that they
are different. State courts and state constitutional law are much less
studied than their federal counterparts. Any complete evaluation of
juristocracy must take account of the evolving role of these sub-

national courts here and abroad.

86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); William E. Nelson, Commentary, Changing Conceptions ofJudicial Review: The Evolution of ConstitutionalTheory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U.
PA. L. REv. 1166, 1169-70 (1972).
87. In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 75, at 401.

